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Deconstructing Army Leadership. L4 m- T! A7 }$ f" h8 {4 ]
2 t. f6 s8 m3 x) v8 C
Colonel Christopher R. Paparone, U.S. Army! B" M2 b, y$ C8 U% Z# Y
Instructor, U.S. Army War College6 h2 d# v% A0 U; C0 S
, p5 |- N" H! B& E8 x. W4 F
entists tend to forget that they are and that they are9 }2 H9 J9 D0 h5 w! ], ~
value-laden and not objective.)2
* A6 ~$ n4 S: y4 W; mThe key to this critical discourse is to identify underlying
' ^ \$ o+ A: g* Aassumptions that might be taken as fact and& V$ d# C& m) f) q
then argue for alternative assumptions.3 The. d2 |9 x u4 I# k5 C" J
deconstructive process “look[s] for those spaces k2 H2 [) O5 E' {. E5 G
where the text is more likely to be submerging ‘its
: r: N, c; p% c. _+ v6 Q. Wother.’ It is there that the text is attempting to construct. o8 _9 r3 ^3 Y6 A
its own ‘truth’—where it can be shown to$ U% W$ t n" T, J/ W
omit, ignore, or devalue its opposite—and where it( N9 ]5 z: c1 {2 E& q
is likely to contradict its own claims.”4
9 O" e1 ?7 ]4 X% PTwo types of outcomes are possible after* s) f0 {; i3 E
deconstruction. One is that the Army’s current leadership% ]' u2 }' ?. q5 C, S( G
paradigm will be strengthened because the
8 h/ w4 P$ U5 E" D" I7 _, l" Oparadigm held up well to attack. If so, deconstruction
% x$ w) [& Y+ X- x7 |will be a reinforcing process, and only incremental- K& p7 M1 O1 X) W* T
changes to the Army’s theory will be necessary.
* d" P* F) V9 e7 y. u, _* JWe can make quality improvements to understanding
& m. e. ]8 M- A' m# dthe problems at hand within the limits of an
3 r7 {$ z( [. X, l+ \8 {" Y& Vincrementally improved theory of effective leadership.
( |" T! I5 j# t) S8 e- b: x! m( lThe second outcome is realizing that the Army’s! r% n# g9 G$ N7 }- f3 d
assumptions about leadership are myths (or are at1 ?3 R& I8 V0 t/ D3 B& f7 P: P
least socially interpretable and based on conflicting
% h3 {3 H, Q5 W4 I' Kvalues), and that transcendence to a higher plane. S7 G. o/ p/ O% J- r
of thinking is required to make new sense of the
! e1 N0 _8 g8 [) C2 jworld.3 l6 y; _/ @: W; ~/ {' C f5 z. g0 N
Part of the greater societal paradigm is that we- R) _; i3 l+ m" O
routinely process information to remove paradox;
/ [# v- b' Y0 x7 U Jthat is, we eliminate “contradictory yet interrelated; l: U5 }2 t- j+ I
elements . . . that seem logical in isolation but absurd9 A' X! Y5 ?9 ?( j8 l: Y" e; s
and irrational when appearing simultaneously.”5* n" n% M5 o. g) `4 L9 p [
But, when we conceptualize what the paradox is,
o2 {- J% Y9 {4 f, Y: dthe act of conceptualization can serve as a transcendental
- l, w8 x0 Q4 u& `9 G9 qmechanism—through a healthy dose of organizational8 J* s; d9 p" r: a0 H
dissonance. Transformational change
& |0 B2 G7 x; \5 ncan result from dissonance and incommensurability.$ G1 Y& r5 c* c y( b6 z; O: u& k
We can reach new ways of framing the problems# A- K" z; \8 V! x; R8 u
of paradox through synthesis and dialectical reasoning# v; M0 P. m: }8 y% C: A
or by accepting paradox as a normal state of5 m$ t# H( X( N- t
organization.
; j) N5 p3 ?6 FMirror Images and Circular Logic
3 d% k u- A, ?4 [+ X2 }. l) xThe Army’s leadership construct, rooted in the assumption. A [3 I; q7 q, \: P4 G3 u w2 s
of hierarchy, is an example of the stratified
( |% ^' M: H% }% o+ V' o* {systems theory (SST) proposed by psychologist. s( s/ P1 p+ q% r) o
Elliott Jaques.6 The essence of the SST is that) _2 z- P6 i5 q8 k
hierarchy is the best way to organize for accountability
9 u) l0 N+ X5 V5 L8 K& _# M" Z# uand control. Discovering what makes leaders: l9 {- o' k! j7 H* ]3 U0 _
at the top of the hierarchy successful allows- n. F6 x, F7 {- e3 H# C4 g
one to train and educate successors in those same
^$ i* g. B: U/ A# l# l: ^qualities.7 The theory espouses that strategic leaders# `- n6 |* m& O$ l: \7 [$ Q
at the hierarchy’s higher echelons have frames
8 G; a. ~/ o9 p sof reference that are more—
9 ?- ^' ^" a3 Nl Interconnected, sophisticated, and actionoriented.5 Y( a5 A% v' b/ f( g
l Likely to anticipate second- and third-order! ~; G; m# w1 H2 v# \
effects because their frames of reference contain c2 d, m: k: U+ Y
complex adaptive systems (networks).' r& d- M/ G0 M
l Oriented on the organization’s external environment.
5 {- N1 s! K9 n+ @* Z5 O8
6 M T' i ]3 ~% PThe academe has commented unfavorably on hierarchical: p( ?, E( n6 a/ l+ i
theories of leadership because empirical7 y; l3 H# K7 w" B3 n
evidence has led scholars and practitioners away3 p2 y: T7 c* i
from assumptions about performance based on age
) a' W2 A4 n+ Z, `$ kand experience and the need for hierarchical accountability.3 J9 T1 N8 H% T4 Z
9 Indeed, the information available to; J3 u$ o- h: x7 `7 k' K0 P
people who occupy high positions gives them significant9 _$ I9 Y: T/ o' S ~
advantages over those who do not have access
" G. E9 R: {9 Pto that information, which produces information
, n& L5 u' c/ {1 |asymmetry. Thus, studies confirm that strategic! j+ Q5 V) o* N, V2 O$ v- M+ e
leaders make better decisions, but such studies rely5 {& J9 }- j3 P% W
on circular logic; for example, the reason strategic
9 G3 r, [$ {. ?leaders make better decisions is because they are
( B( e# Q1 u/ q1 g0 [3 Nbetter informed, and they are better informed because* {: U% ?, F& y; w- ~- P
they are strategic leaders.9 P y, V. [8 Q. h# }
Because the Army is hierarchical, it is suitable to
. M! N ^+ \% }- j8 ?: Ttheorize about leadership along these lines of thought.
7 _' U9 k) w8 ~! V2 V; FThis is the reality that SST deals with as a normative4 i5 P7 E: E1 r' W8 q
and descriptive theory of “what is,” but postindustrial! y. U% b1 {9 Q
organizations do not have much in common
+ k2 W/ Z/ z8 c9 q* vwith bureaucracies, with their layers of management5 K) d7 ~# m- V* M
and stovepiped functional arrangements.. w! h1 L# S4 C' M( @- t D
In the 21st century, it is no longer acceptable to5 h. Q- M( l- Y
assume that a leader’s influence on effectiveness
, \% G$ \# h8 E6 Q# g) gis attributable to his position or rank. An understanding
& ~3 k V2 C0 p% y. Q1 Qof leadership requires a much broader, more complex
) M, h4 Q& C: j. H( z4 z0 u1 Mview of organizational effectiveness. Perhaps) E% m& O! n% b; M
the Army’s hierarchical view of leadership blinds us" i8 O1 u; f4 l9 w$ S
to other interpretations. Gary Yukl, a leadership theorist,) n/ G3 k2 a* E' N) Z: s& y# n
makes the point that “viewing leadership in terms
" E8 v5 r. K0 K- nof reciprocal, recursive influence processes among
9 {" ~* j" w# i7 z8 [multiple parties in a systems context is very different" `* N: D) J% f# e) b
from studying the unidirectional effects of a4 }- f: J/ y6 @- ^
single leader on subordinates, and new research/ r1 R* z" }; s) d+ } p5 c4 L
methods may be needed to describe and analyze the$ G; n) A+ f& n7 U6 k3 S
complex nature of leadership processes in a social0 C7 X5 I% G* b7 t( ^. u" }& w b7 B& r
system.”10
+ _% @1 v0 s* S1 {% }$ C kStudies confirm that strategic leaders
& g1 v# z4 x- `6 R' b9 U0 D- e% e6 Fmake better decisions, but such studies rely on+ H/ \- h2 q! ~8 A8 s& {+ J# H
circular logic; for example, the reason strategic
% s, `' L5 v8 E4 j2 Lleaders make better decisions is because they are
; D* Y* X6 E! s* w; D( `better informed, and they are better informed9 t. S- _. R$ \" }9 q/ }
because they are strategic leaders.+ j1 K# K3 p5 n/ V# K4 O
DECONSTRUCTING
0 a1 o/ I t: R0 VARMY LEADERSHIP
) D' L B$ L. b8 w8 b- k) l4 January -February 2004 l MILITARY REVIEW
( z3 U/ o: B. {9 K5 Z" YHaving invested heavily in its hierarchical interpretation
" T! b- m4 x( P5 T! c$ nof leadership, in the late 1980s the Army
; m' d$ u+ k* k- t4 G" f4 R' ]! Dsponsored studies of the characteristics and traits of7 |+ H6 m* ] \/ S+ ~/ b' y! m" Z; H
three- and four-star generals. The studies defined! d4 H, h! M% n* a) x
effectiveness in terms of the characteristics of “successful”
, G+ R$ \, F3 q9 vleaders who had been promoted. In the
% L" Z5 O3 u. ]" {8 O- `same tradition of research, the USAWC surveyed5 E2 n) A: A! Q2 a9 l) u) ~ g
general officers periodically to determine if officers* P6 @+ F% v# R T0 k( u& _9 @
who were its graduates were effective as a result
+ R" p3 e- w8 f& d7 [of the college’s efforts to mold them into strategic4 H l/ w2 z0 l. m+ @. |0 e. P F
leaders.11 Because of this closed-loop thinking, the4 Y) r; ^7 }. Q$ Y% ^/ D2 s8 P* M
Army generated a theory of leadership with an obvious
3 z" C) [" F8 S1 U5 Lmirror-image problem. A leader is said to be
7 x7 l- a4 L/ |% p) eeffective to the extent that he displays the characteristics/ z% W2 ~& _) }- f7 U' O& M
of those who are in positions of power (and,
2 [0 h3 Z/ z. Ltherefore, presumed to be effective); this is clearly
6 z9 Q. D4 a# l( Da case of circular logic.$ s9 z9 |: y, p. p7 r, v
Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, |
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