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Deconstructing Army Leadership( p1 I/ W1 U. Q$ y7 ?7 k
3 `- J0 R! r1 r: Q' fColonel Christopher R. Paparone, U.S. Army- j# _, k0 ~1 p( t- q
Instructor, U.S. Army War College
n: h: h$ Z0 y9 d. U. b( y k+ o) p& `% l r
entists tend to forget that they are and that they are
+ G; H9 Q/ L8 d; A! v$ K/ O5 l3 S Bvalue-laden and not objective.)2
& w7 o' ?* u5 SThe key to this critical discourse is to identify underlying
% ~+ s* W6 s9 X) M6 v. n3 Cassumptions that might be taken as fact and( h2 k$ ?! y+ A( L6 f: J
then argue for alternative assumptions.3 The
7 s& D( ?' d0 _8 E# v8 ~deconstructive process “look[s] for those spaces0 l) b& c! A2 L" {( e0 m* `
where the text is more likely to be submerging ‘its
) o) ~2 P8 c& a" \other.’ It is there that the text is attempting to construct
0 R& ~0 n& M! ^, R2 \) a% g( Cits own ‘truth’—where it can be shown to
% [, L+ R8 C: z6 Zomit, ignore, or devalue its opposite—and where it
( L1 F8 ~) X8 Jis likely to contradict its own claims.”4
" y+ ]7 u2 L# u( TTwo types of outcomes are possible after5 C4 M& J3 _5 L- V% ^ j
deconstruction. One is that the Army’s current leadership
' v; [0 o/ `9 {1 I. pparadigm will be strengthened because the
) u. O9 Y7 A" [9 Z& V: Aparadigm held up well to attack. If so, deconstruction: _( [. N1 z& ?7 W- y# z
will be a reinforcing process, and only incremental
- q3 l8 v0 X- ]* Gchanges to the Army’s theory will be necessary.
7 r' |, h! l- `3 jWe can make quality improvements to understanding. U) v3 h( H- A
the problems at hand within the limits of an
6 }- [" J' F- M2 N+ _- y( c5 a: v0 h9 Jincrementally improved theory of effective leadership.
+ j, }( Z( l8 T1 R) J; ]' uThe second outcome is realizing that the Army’s
4 z" ~/ \* |$ _! iassumptions about leadership are myths (or are at
0 X7 S& V7 o, Q7 P+ Sleast socially interpretable and based on conflicting9 ^, x2 `& A0 L4 B" B
values), and that transcendence to a higher plane& ?6 D' t" Y( J; F
of thinking is required to make new sense of the
% p! ?( Y& \. t) Fworld.5 T6 Q$ _' j4 E9 O
Part of the greater societal paradigm is that we' v/ ]$ n% O) r2 [; m" J* `- P& ^3 l
routinely process information to remove paradox;& N/ O3 a- S$ m u5 F0 s
that is, we eliminate “contradictory yet interrelated2 o. J' i# x" I) V( U9 r3 Y
elements . . . that seem logical in isolation but absurd& A* @4 s9 q( ^0 D/ X" l4 Y
and irrational when appearing simultaneously.”5# |4 f; b; `2 e s0 h/ d' b/ K0 J
But, when we conceptualize what the paradox is,
. a. Q/ n$ ]" J8 q7 o3 `, `$ kthe act of conceptualization can serve as a transcendental
' j. o3 w7 G- O5 f) m% `% F: I# g. Zmechanism—through a healthy dose of organizational/ X8 v( W: W2 ~9 a
dissonance. Transformational change
% E2 l% }# g1 ^! h! acan result from dissonance and incommensurability.
3 o3 y# q# u* w+ e. g2 h+ SWe can reach new ways of framing the problems
: c' T5 y- {7 E- _of paradox through synthesis and dialectical reasoning8 o- z% u v8 v+ k8 p
or by accepting paradox as a normal state of
. c4 p9 j9 b# x- e/ R8 ^1 Corganization.- f9 I1 J5 @ @$ O2 J& B
Mirror Images and Circular Logic! Z* l# R [; U( A. r( m
The Army’s leadership construct, rooted in the assumption' U+ o {" D# p- E# \/ o( @* q
of hierarchy, is an example of the stratified% h; _. b/ G3 c$ t' m
systems theory (SST) proposed by psychologist
! d% ^/ n9 F9 @6 DElliott Jaques.6 The essence of the SST is that
6 }4 s/ v8 V6 O" A5 E7 v9 G) |1 phierarchy is the best way to organize for accountability
8 M) P7 s( H/ T! ~$ Cand control. Discovering what makes leaders
9 H N0 p9 t" {9 w. g5 sat the top of the hierarchy successful allows6 j9 h- X( J0 G6 ]3 L! ]2 \
one to train and educate successors in those same
1 N7 g0 b. {' j- w; A0 wqualities.7 The theory espouses that strategic leaders
w- Z# c% s; Z6 l& w, R# b5 Kat the hierarchy’s higher echelons have frames
6 Q4 D9 n' ]. w! W1 _" ^, o8 Nof reference that are more—
) V; {. d* A5 u9 Pl Interconnected, sophisticated, and actionoriented.2 s2 F6 \1 G; ^6 r
l Likely to anticipate second- and third-order2 d1 L3 `7 Y% U6 Q
effects because their frames of reference contain- `( M* Y: q% c! M% I+ w1 ] J
complex adaptive systems (networks).4 L& D- q5 u" I: `( i' ~: w
l Oriented on the organization’s external environment.
9 @( l5 O: `# e; @. F8 Y8
" q' a5 I! E& I P+ g/ JThe academe has commented unfavorably on hierarchical
# Z2 F. Y$ k- W4 g' X" @: ztheories of leadership because empirical
$ M8 @" B: Z8 kevidence has led scholars and practitioners away# L$ o0 `5 E* B* J
from assumptions about performance based on age7 b! ^% C. d) k9 h/ K0 f0 V8 x* \
and experience and the need for hierarchical accountability.
$ x$ n; P( r+ i. ?; @/ r- {9 Indeed, the information available to# _! {- n" y w! H& H; f/ \
people who occupy high positions gives them significant
9 ^$ c' L/ `) tadvantages over those who do not have access
& J) Y9 ^- a4 n7 r- p. ^to that information, which produces information! S8 W) \) F5 Z
asymmetry. Thus, studies confirm that strategic
- g. a( r$ _3 D# wleaders make better decisions, but such studies rely9 m0 f+ f9 E7 X3 r' s
on circular logic; for example, the reason strategic: ^2 c7 H: o5 H, f0 {6 t
leaders make better decisions is because they are
2 t' m0 w1 Y# z) M# qbetter informed, and they are better informed because2 K( o# v6 s8 a
they are strategic leaders.) n$ j0 d o2 I" s( i) _
Because the Army is hierarchical, it is suitable to
! z, ]+ P, {+ Otheorize about leadership along these lines of thought." W) x, {$ D( \+ f: S, B& ~
This is the reality that SST deals with as a normative
' j, M0 s& F) f+ ^& r7 e7 uand descriptive theory of “what is,” but postindustrial. J$ S" @9 T U1 t
organizations do not have much in common
; u+ \/ x5 D( j0 Ywith bureaucracies, with their layers of management
: c4 @8 m) t2 {0 ?; N! y6 T5 sand stovepiped functional arrangements.2 v/ y! h' k- I8 r" M3 B* p
In the 21st century, it is no longer acceptable to4 e9 s% p9 s4 j
assume that a leader’s influence on effectiveness) {. |* |* {1 ]2 T
is attributable to his position or rank. An understanding* V3 [4 W# T9 I: u% W, ^
of leadership requires a much broader, more complex- X" d2 C7 }* Z0 c3 x$ o
view of organizational effectiveness. Perhaps+ j, |% j7 z3 b$ k4 \8 |3 i0 ]
the Army’s hierarchical view of leadership blinds us
" X% s% X+ f# _, h# s$ zto other interpretations. Gary Yukl, a leadership theorist," b$ g/ t, u$ V0 |5 u& N
makes the point that “viewing leadership in terms, M1 z" O. W; g F, _' X* Q
of reciprocal, recursive influence processes among1 m5 K: O6 S/ N; Z. w3 |
multiple parties in a systems context is very different& L: w7 p4 H" l1 y+ W( A2 ]( I
from studying the unidirectional effects of a
5 W3 s5 a ]: j( P; |single leader on subordinates, and new research5 T. e. z# U5 R1 o f
methods may be needed to describe and analyze the: F5 P+ q4 f2 @5 \6 I
complex nature of leadership processes in a social! J+ T) z3 i$ x1 s s9 Q% Y# U+ x
system.”10
7 A- C D* B$ ?! L6 f7 l( S$ [Studies confirm that strategic leaders
/ ]8 i* T& U' T5 i4 ^: nmake better decisions, but such studies rely on; P# u" l r; O3 E6 S6 L8 S6 z
circular logic; for example, the reason strategic/ k9 a, u! g9 ?( z' _+ P4 ~4 J
leaders make better decisions is because they are& M. _# {9 N7 V. {, K6 X5 ~
better informed, and they are better informed
( `% U- Q' w$ v$ c$ x% d$ d8 sbecause they are strategic leaders.
7 O$ A! L6 P+ O8 W8 _DECONSTRUCTING
8 W; C# u8 N( ]" BARMY LEADERSHIP
J; M& [/ U8 o/ o# M2 J3 E4 January -February 2004 l MILITARY REVIEW: `# g% X& K$ V
Having invested heavily in its hierarchical interpretation- Z5 Y2 W L6 t1 a
of leadership, in the late 1980s the Army0 U. V6 q2 ]" |8 o4 D
sponsored studies of the characteristics and traits of
: w) Q# Z0 W% v4 B* g2 @" z& nthree- and four-star generals. The studies defined
. L" V7 K8 ?$ ieffectiveness in terms of the characteristics of “successful”
8 H% J" J$ b. Y* c6 c; Tleaders who had been promoted. In the4 z2 {- n/ m' c
same tradition of research, the USAWC surveyed( e/ F8 D3 K$ k, R6 ~
general officers periodically to determine if officers6 Q/ v# n& s1 d$ @8 J" K( Y
who were its graduates were effective as a result
& Y& H- `( J# g/ g) a3 h, V8 {of the college’s efforts to mold them into strategic3 `6 H. t, u2 _
leaders.11 Because of this closed-loop thinking, the
l: |( o6 U$ P% \$ h: dArmy generated a theory of leadership with an obvious8 b" p& H$ r9 G: x& J
mirror-image problem. A leader is said to be/ p% Z. V* n* B- d, C0 F
effective to the extent that he displays the characteristics; R7 d0 \4 O& {+ I; f: Q" L
of those who are in positions of power (and,
. f; \8 Z2 T& A, H% H$ C r% N6 ?therefore, presumed to be effective); this is clearly
, m6 i6 w# Z* c' _1 L- G( ea case of circular logic.
! `; y8 F) C4 j4 aArmy Field Manual (FM) 22-100, |
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