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Deconstructing Army Leadership
! g m% e1 g, t+ `' y& B- h& t J Z2 n! K( L7 D* S/ g
Colonel Christopher R. Paparone, U.S. Army
3 H4 ~0 D5 m" U/ e: a1 r1 m+ sInstructor, U.S. Army War College
( s6 x, C4 v7 j0 Q" _$ X/ B7 Z8 v6 T
entists tend to forget that they are and that they are/ I( ~/ h4 D4 E4 |% }, Z5 F
value-laden and not objective.)2
; ?7 D! y9 R0 S7 m5 ^2 M: D: u/ [The key to this critical discourse is to identify underlying
2 B% L( I4 r& Xassumptions that might be taken as fact and
N1 B: X2 m! A% k5 N- C$ Tthen argue for alternative assumptions.3 The$ r9 c- n1 U- ^+ C1 O& z* o
deconstructive process “look[s] for those spaces
+ A4 ?2 ]( ]; ~% J" f: K; Zwhere the text is more likely to be submerging ‘its: c8 t* G4 V. {* X0 ?7 o# \* ]
other.’ It is there that the text is attempting to construct/ r7 N6 h" H7 U" v$ h3 W
its own ‘truth’—where it can be shown to6 A& v' `7 i# V& p/ U* c
omit, ignore, or devalue its opposite—and where it) c5 |) m" v) t# g2 |+ y
is likely to contradict its own claims.”4& U; w+ R3 h0 P+ t* ^2 z$ X4 M( p3 D
Two types of outcomes are possible after
! r3 X4 p% t3 z& t1 `! R9 g5 q& udeconstruction. One is that the Army’s current leadership/ [+ Y9 a; C% G/ H0 O9 i9 j
paradigm will be strengthened because the
; t8 E) M# t7 Zparadigm held up well to attack. If so, deconstruction k& I: s+ |3 k# O9 d& @
will be a reinforcing process, and only incremental" J# N e3 u: O( X. Z' b- ^
changes to the Army’s theory will be necessary.
! v# L& D+ X# n$ x. wWe can make quality improvements to understanding8 ]/ U$ [3 I) C/ K' ~* p* [. y* q0 s
the problems at hand within the limits of an
! p7 }& [; s) z9 J9 Uincrementally improved theory of effective leadership.
% ]$ n7 P5 b2 {; XThe second outcome is realizing that the Army’s; [( m, k+ T; L; r# \, q
assumptions about leadership are myths (or are at* `7 {3 e* O- o4 z+ Y; Y( B& Y
least socially interpretable and based on conflicting
3 f; m% j7 o! uvalues), and that transcendence to a higher plane
- Q1 x+ m4 a S6 `0 vof thinking is required to make new sense of the" x# X6 g; h5 C2 O/ t' h9 } M
world.6 U9 N) p- Q: K
Part of the greater societal paradigm is that we4 B- f5 D! l% ^
routinely process information to remove paradox;" l1 r3 K j3 N( N! V4 s
that is, we eliminate “contradictory yet interrelated
' w3 Z1 r2 k- \2 Uelements . . . that seem logical in isolation but absurd
' m/ W* N9 f8 i, ^& K8 ]and irrational when appearing simultaneously.”54 B* e, ], g( p! w
But, when we conceptualize what the paradox is,
, ^( R: j% L _the act of conceptualization can serve as a transcendental
$ H3 ]1 z" F7 b3 r( bmechanism—through a healthy dose of organizational9 P& t6 C' V7 m
dissonance. Transformational change$ Y; q( b$ V# H1 a* d. k9 L1 z8 F
can result from dissonance and incommensurability.# W/ C& j O& U" i
We can reach new ways of framing the problems
2 |7 u: v" o& w( A+ [$ bof paradox through synthesis and dialectical reasoning
8 i2 z, d. y+ i+ ]9 j2 G- s% Ror by accepting paradox as a normal state of: g* P% J3 v: }4 K" n
organization.
+ m$ ^) X( S3 aMirror Images and Circular Logic6 y: }9 r, a0 X6 P4 o
The Army’s leadership construct, rooted in the assumption4 u" J- b5 H$ k# x4 @
of hierarchy, is an example of the stratified( @& \3 p7 J: ?$ H- J4 x+ ^# O
systems theory (SST) proposed by psychologist; }2 b7 J! K0 U0 V: r! R- I
Elliott Jaques.6 The essence of the SST is that+ s" M, i; K* v/ a4 y8 h9 X3 l
hierarchy is the best way to organize for accountability
' L2 s) V) E& R3 q! x3 ~7 s1 S+ e; ~% E' hand control. Discovering what makes leaders
: I- P! t8 x$ lat the top of the hierarchy successful allows
! e( f! P6 V* A! Uone to train and educate successors in those same* @# q( M$ f/ J
qualities.7 The theory espouses that strategic leaders1 w) d7 `7 _$ j0 R/ _; E
at the hierarchy’s higher echelons have frames
! E) Q/ V# T$ X% p; Q6 D% Dof reference that are more—
5 w% H7 A% d# r( C/ E L/ sl Interconnected, sophisticated, and actionoriented.( m+ R5 p. J& D
l Likely to anticipate second- and third-order
* l8 F, N6 {7 U7 }effects because their frames of reference contain
|& g9 u0 Q3 R" n5 Z; z1 ccomplex adaptive systems (networks).
! L: `: B3 [+ {: o; J6 Hl Oriented on the organization’s external environment.
* [# x: Q4 o, s7 F8
: ^4 t, P' A2 Q" e; iThe academe has commented unfavorably on hierarchical" ~6 J% i5 N" s; F6 n
theories of leadership because empirical
Y. o: B" T. T5 t# jevidence has led scholars and practitioners away
# {& {6 Z3 z# Vfrom assumptions about performance based on age
% K* h0 j: ?5 gand experience and the need for hierarchical accountability.
. t3 }1 C6 a2 U! ]' b9 Indeed, the information available to! }/ @7 s$ r. Z" V7 R* g
people who occupy high positions gives them significant" e' Y. k% l8 X0 g3 e
advantages over those who do not have access9 |5 O, ~: o% d, u) n5 @
to that information, which produces information
" R6 F ~" y4 f* g0 |asymmetry. Thus, studies confirm that strategic* P p' Z1 a: L3 z" X- y, Y
leaders make better decisions, but such studies rely
2 ^5 \; ? C! V- P1 ? H% D. Non circular logic; for example, the reason strategic
1 p. T$ u# A1 Q1 sleaders make better decisions is because they are: d1 W% |1 H% N( A7 n
better informed, and they are better informed because9 }9 ]7 ?$ _. J: V3 n% w4 e$ ?. I
they are strategic leaders.% X9 M& j, K3 R7 A* U H$ V! _3 g
Because the Army is hierarchical, it is suitable to6 }& A: A& p0 s% m
theorize about leadership along these lines of thought.4 l {% h( x0 W7 {" G
This is the reality that SST deals with as a normative! \ v6 O& ?4 D9 X) S* Q
and descriptive theory of “what is,” but postindustrial
* G0 d! u1 L3 ? t! K8 g: z2 A5 _organizations do not have much in common0 G" @$ A; X4 Q9 G) d J
with bureaucracies, with their layers of management) |4 T6 Z' H- r) x3 n
and stovepiped functional arrangements.
. e. p# q* X/ gIn the 21st century, it is no longer acceptable to
& `6 o% E5 I9 I# {+ s$ W- uassume that a leader’s influence on effectiveness, U6 `- S, D: ]; `/ ]
is attributable to his position or rank. An understanding
7 @" w' h; y2 ] }of leadership requires a much broader, more complex
8 _7 |# g" K, l8 P9 bview of organizational effectiveness. Perhaps
" k6 X" V# }) {6 @the Army’s hierarchical view of leadership blinds us
0 U0 o1 o; I$ k& Y% N T$ Qto other interpretations. Gary Yukl, a leadership theorist,
2 P- P, S8 [; R7 Y' y% Y# f- Kmakes the point that “viewing leadership in terms
$ I2 ?" W2 n, f# z& Q5 `of reciprocal, recursive influence processes among
7 t) V3 |; X0 ^2 qmultiple parties in a systems context is very different
0 D) T, q+ } r Zfrom studying the unidirectional effects of a
' W7 @) I5 z. [! e+ X6 Rsingle leader on subordinates, and new research6 u/ n9 w& z* k. P
methods may be needed to describe and analyze the
9 [3 \8 p) f1 Zcomplex nature of leadership processes in a social
. N7 J6 s' _6 ~3 J( b" p2 h% [. o* rsystem.”10
. ]. _0 S/ S. ^- L5 z8 N! ]Studies confirm that strategic leaders' `. i1 |- z: z' G
make better decisions, but such studies rely on
: r4 [: q; U3 U/ k7 s& W# I7 acircular logic; for example, the reason strategic) s5 q2 W! r% n
leaders make better decisions is because they are% z2 m" M* f) K, o" i
better informed, and they are better informed. U6 I$ R. `% S8 [% F8 K9 |
because they are strategic leaders.& @ o: \+ r6 U8 n( g5 y4 X
DECONSTRUCTING) E* d6 M: F9 q$ t8 X
ARMY LEADERSHIP4 I$ X3 T1 e# k& D# i
4 January -February 2004 l MILITARY REVIEW
7 b. I D; N [Having invested heavily in its hierarchical interpretation
6 T7 I# Z2 k3 U$ o8 u' Tof leadership, in the late 1980s the Army
3 v0 ^# I; ^3 k. N3 h# gsponsored studies of the characteristics and traits of
/ T( Z& E! z. gthree- and four-star generals. The studies defined
. r( ` _1 v! S7 Z8 m! Deffectiveness in terms of the characteristics of “successful”
+ x7 s' F9 b% i, k+ uleaders who had been promoted. In the
9 m/ g$ I' }: E6 K: Jsame tradition of research, the USAWC surveyed
2 z5 |) h8 N4 e: Qgeneral officers periodically to determine if officers
( [" h- }/ {: f$ R# b' Mwho were its graduates were effective as a result
2 ~/ n' W# G. Y4 E) l- A- s0 Jof the college’s efforts to mold them into strategic/ E* Q5 T, k8 }3 n. f8 v8 q' b
leaders.11 Because of this closed-loop thinking, the+ C$ T, @$ |) |% b) V# x6 _* C
Army generated a theory of leadership with an obvious
3 j) X2 k) |/ o E) L6 ]/ [mirror-image problem. A leader is said to be2 @, n% E7 Q2 y0 I' @
effective to the extent that he displays the characteristics
* u2 J! S8 |& y/ G' A" o( u( xof those who are in positions of power (and,
]% k: h5 i+ T$ B" d4 `therefore, presumed to be effective); this is clearly7 c7 H4 n3 C. L$ Q: j
a case of circular logic.3 }( N, x" |8 R" w+ H \
Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, |
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