- 最后登录
- 2006-9-19
- 注册时间
- 2004-10-31
- 威望
- 0
- 金钱
- 27
- 贡献
- 2
- 阅读权限
- 10
- 积分
- 29
- 日志
- 0
- 记录
- 0
- 帖子
- 20
- 主题
- 5
- 精华
- 0
- 好友
- 0

该用户从未签到  - 注册时间
- 2004-10-31
- 最后登录
- 2006-9-19
- 积分
- 29
- 精华
- 0
- 主题
- 5
- 帖子
- 20
|
Deconstructing Army Leadership0 n- ?1 S d' Q1 C
2 b/ q! l/ ~6 P2 Y. W
Colonel Christopher R. Paparone, U.S. Army) Y9 {) n j P g; v5 P: R
Instructor, U.S. Army War College
1 o& i) V: T9 s9 h0 X, r" T* B# H& x0 K+ [6 T( D
entists tend to forget that they are and that they are6 s$ c+ p! f3 J3 C
value-laden and not objective.)2$ | R" m/ V5 U& {! x: ^
The key to this critical discourse is to identify underlying7 B+ w3 A* l. z: `# v
assumptions that might be taken as fact and2 H; W7 u4 r2 R% W# E: N
then argue for alternative assumptions.3 The4 _( B% }* y2 z0 e" g e a% B$ y
deconstructive process “look[s] for those spaces+ a/ u; ~, b5 w9 q
where the text is more likely to be submerging ‘its! m2 z! I. ^/ a6 L! M- B
other.’ It is there that the text is attempting to construct* H |, f* E& s- }& P
its own ‘truth’—where it can be shown to
& P( y+ b& c! [. y2 Womit, ignore, or devalue its opposite—and where it
6 e5 w1 }4 E* w, His likely to contradict its own claims.”4
6 M: L3 ]& q0 k; U# \. x, ETwo types of outcomes are possible after
; C% u) R5 E/ L) A: v; wdeconstruction. One is that the Army’s current leadership
5 N6 t- x, Y7 I; Tparadigm will be strengthened because the8 x- C r- Y: V8 s6 C6 `( g. _
paradigm held up well to attack. If so, deconstruction' Y+ f$ Q" H# {9 j: o. ~
will be a reinforcing process, and only incremental
* P% S* J% o) c7 `changes to the Army’s theory will be necessary.! I( {1 k: ?( v' `
We can make quality improvements to understanding4 h V# x2 V% [/ o
the problems at hand within the limits of an, f. S7 h- a( N4 N3 n4 ^
incrementally improved theory of effective leadership.6 R5 d' C. |9 }7 n5 F
The second outcome is realizing that the Army’s$ j+ q% y( ?) _
assumptions about leadership are myths (or are at' q$ {9 Z! s, J# {
least socially interpretable and based on conflicting1 ?, K3 q+ _' o9 v7 o' F
values), and that transcendence to a higher plane8 y; |, n8 T" x% T2 e8 g w, s
of thinking is required to make new sense of the Z/ Y/ ?5 Y* x$ m( K1 i; c+ ]
world.2 X% k! O$ a8 z+ T/ P1 |: v
Part of the greater societal paradigm is that we- |' h& |( ?8 [: A
routinely process information to remove paradox;- s2 u6 P0 t% P6 `4 o3 t
that is, we eliminate “contradictory yet interrelated5 \0 ~+ Y$ f( \/ G& V2 W
elements . . . that seem logical in isolation but absurd; W# v) g! N D
and irrational when appearing simultaneously.”5' K+ ^! O& D# ^! K1 F
But, when we conceptualize what the paradox is,3 F" w2 }* l& U+ L' [* Q
the act of conceptualization can serve as a transcendental1 Q2 Z3 V4 X; k3 G5 |
mechanism—through a healthy dose of organizational
5 s- w$ l* L; rdissonance. Transformational change4 S5 B* w& v+ ^* C0 _
can result from dissonance and incommensurability.; x5 z* H( t, m" m1 ?6 @
We can reach new ways of framing the problems
" P, a5 |+ T9 {* a9 a5 v) [0 Tof paradox through synthesis and dialectical reasoning( L& C3 x# D, \' }7 k, f1 U+ j
or by accepting paradox as a normal state of( ^$ [ c0 Q) V8 k; c
organization.
/ r: I! y0 t7 ^( |Mirror Images and Circular Logic
2 Z; p9 n. }1 {' W" {The Army’s leadership construct, rooted in the assumption
* h5 |" O8 ^" V5 d# G D1 G: v1 Bof hierarchy, is an example of the stratified# m0 P$ M, O. Y
systems theory (SST) proposed by psychologist+ f" `# T9 ~: a* l# a6 s
Elliott Jaques.6 The essence of the SST is that* o; ]/ u6 w' C
hierarchy is the best way to organize for accountability1 b: V* P5 W# L1 S" B3 D, T! _+ k
and control. Discovering what makes leaders9 N% H+ |0 P- O" y) M% d
at the top of the hierarchy successful allows& C4 R9 j. I4 g+ X" C- K$ q) J `4 _
one to train and educate successors in those same
5 T8 F9 Y, e6 O6 w: g5 {1 Equalities.7 The theory espouses that strategic leaders
" t/ c0 \- |( t9 f Q: yat the hierarchy’s higher echelons have frames
( V/ E. I' M4 @: s" {% vof reference that are more—" ~! j& V* V0 Q$ K9 v$ [
l Interconnected, sophisticated, and actionoriented.
; c) E) t# F8 V0 j% {l Likely to anticipate second- and third-order
7 {8 y5 c1 Q M r9 xeffects because their frames of reference contain a" R2 S l# A! l0 }) e# a1 c5 ~# j
complex adaptive systems (networks).% L5 l: j8 C8 N! }! b) H' x
l Oriented on the organization’s external environment.
/ v8 I% h: O+ d+ q! L8
: B/ A, D. `- t. K0 A1 U ~$ CThe academe has commented unfavorably on hierarchical
" U, ^# C& s- S* i( _1 _6 ?& ytheories of leadership because empirical
: a% }' L& `) \/ [evidence has led scholars and practitioners away3 ^, B; {3 G$ ~$ u \" @- S2 W
from assumptions about performance based on age' }# l& L& y7 I" Y Q$ N& K
and experience and the need for hierarchical accountability.
- w& [7 Z2 A- M! H* D! V9 Indeed, the information available to
- T: I- K! X# @people who occupy high positions gives them significant& q( N) \3 N6 z8 B" R
advantages over those who do not have access
8 t8 q0 \( u5 I8 i" k eto that information, which produces information" n( k* Z8 L; }7 x' D: ^
asymmetry. Thus, studies confirm that strategic
( r: d2 O3 j, B" gleaders make better decisions, but such studies rely
" W) ]: _+ D0 ^ h9 m5 m; M+ Y$ ]on circular logic; for example, the reason strategic/ f9 ~. g! E( k
leaders make better decisions is because they are) {2 `5 F; d, e! O" i
better informed, and they are better informed because. s6 }+ `. q* d3 h: ^
they are strategic leaders.# g+ p) B- ~1 Z7 v: |7 e7 k
Because the Army is hierarchical, it is suitable to
8 |( V( l3 m8 @: ]: u9 `theorize about leadership along these lines of thought.
" q2 t, u$ W5 [. d& yThis is the reality that SST deals with as a normative
# w/ |5 }; M$ v$ j4 A5 U7 eand descriptive theory of “what is,” but postindustrial
$ T6 m2 Q# u! Corganizations do not have much in common
: o2 j, T/ C( O5 Uwith bureaucracies, with their layers of management: O0 @# c' U. J. h# i" y! {" d
and stovepiped functional arrangements.
2 R, c3 E& v+ VIn the 21st century, it is no longer acceptable to
* ]8 @0 |6 h6 `assume that a leader’s influence on effectiveness
: ~+ Z% e0 l' e- ris attributable to his position or rank. An understanding
/ \" i0 R: a: f, Cof leadership requires a much broader, more complex
! t! h: L8 f$ P& Uview of organizational effectiveness. Perhaps& {( ~$ h4 T( u8 g- s H5 ?. C
the Army’s hierarchical view of leadership blinds us
" P: u( N. l4 P6 a( i! Bto other interpretations. Gary Yukl, a leadership theorist,
) H; Z7 B& s" y* `makes the point that “viewing leadership in terms! h- |1 B+ |5 P6 e
of reciprocal, recursive influence processes among
- m& k: Z$ y1 y1 Hmultiple parties in a systems context is very different1 J, i5 t+ x8 l- O/ r
from studying the unidirectional effects of a
5 P9 ]' Y' @2 R- w/ Qsingle leader on subordinates, and new research
9 a. M5 l& r N m' D) `! [, I) Amethods may be needed to describe and analyze the- i8 e0 z8 P( _' z5 I# w' S/ M. M- {
complex nature of leadership processes in a social
6 ?0 y1 Y$ `) V1 N( c3 ^! {( Qsystem.”101 K) X" G1 S% \; G& ]
Studies confirm that strategic leaders9 R3 Z5 }& w8 S3 H
make better decisions, but such studies rely on
& |2 D. @& l- j/ P0 zcircular logic; for example, the reason strategic
% p; {5 A& z: R6 \5 Aleaders make better decisions is because they are
6 D/ W% g8 T0 S- {better informed, and they are better informed
( e$ q! {7 M6 K( Vbecause they are strategic leaders.
& C1 m3 l# u) r0 F4 c8 m$ L% ZDECONSTRUCTING
8 _, m( ^: K& Z; Y5 g6 P' NARMY LEADERSHIP
% K0 x8 G+ J2 H5 g+ F4 January -February 2004 l MILITARY REVIEW) n2 H q2 {8 F% h: X4 h; t3 e
Having invested heavily in its hierarchical interpretation3 a9 [- z. H4 ^8 k6 }# E& A- x
of leadership, in the late 1980s the Army3 Q: [0 \ i# q. a% Y9 {" Y1 J
sponsored studies of the characteristics and traits of) `1 M e! ]; c2 B8 ~
three- and four-star generals. The studies defined( Z2 j) e1 x% n( o( E4 P
effectiveness in terms of the characteristics of “successful”, y' g* [6 @5 N$ m6 U0 b' J/ d
leaders who had been promoted. In the
4 i% _: L& F+ ^: v5 msame tradition of research, the USAWC surveyed6 h. D7 n& }6 l4 u
general officers periodically to determine if officers1 W8 }3 k1 ]$ @. g7 Z1 O. j
who were its graduates were effective as a result" z U# X7 r# G# s! N# A
of the college’s efforts to mold them into strategic) y- ^) _! b5 Q. ]$ [/ L
leaders.11 Because of this closed-loop thinking, the
# N5 J6 P! h* e7 M' ~ HArmy generated a theory of leadership with an obvious
2 f8 r6 x, D. e7 Ymirror-image problem. A leader is said to be9 m- W3 T7 w( {- }9 j
effective to the extent that he displays the characteristics
) r0 \6 p: w2 J9 Z6 Z4 s6 |3 j; Dof those who are in positions of power (and,$ o% T5 e3 E9 @! U- `8 e; \+ D
therefore, presumed to be effective); this is clearly4 f- m; `% _6 i" m5 U6 ^3 x
a case of circular logic.2 K# H, A& F* J$ d0 e
Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, |
|