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[转载] 解构军队领导(军事评论杂志2004年度最佳)

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发表于 2005-9-5 16:50:00 |只看该作者 |倒序浏览
Deconstructing Army Leadership0 n- ?1 S d' Q1 C 2 b/ q! l/ ~6 P2 Y. W Colonel Christopher R. Paparone, U.S. Army) Y9 {) n j P g; v5 P: R Instructor, U.S. Army War College 1 o& i) V: T9 s9 h0 X, r" T* B# H& x0 K+ [6 T( D entists tend to forget that they are and that they are6 s$ c+ p! f3 J3 C value-laden and not objective.)2$ | R" m/ V5 U& {! x: ^ The key to this critical discourse is to identify underlying7 B+ w3 A* l. z: `# v assumptions that might be taken as fact and2 H; W7 u4 r2 R% W# E: N then argue for alternative assumptions.3 The4 _( B% }* y2 z0 e" g e a% B$ y deconstructive process “look[s] for those spaces+ a/ u; ~, b5 w9 q where the text is more likely to be submerging ‘its! m2 z! I. ^/ a6 L! M- B other.’ It is there that the text is attempting to construct* H |, f* E& s- }& P its own ‘truth’—where it can be shown to & P( y+ b& c! [. y2 Womit, ignore, or devalue its opposite—and where it 6 e5 w1 }4 E* w, His likely to contradict its own claims.”4 6 M: L3 ]& q0 k; U# \. x, ETwo types of outcomes are possible after ; C% u) R5 E/ L) A: v; wdeconstruction. One is that the Army’s current leadership 5 N6 t- x, Y7 I; Tparadigm will be strengthened because the8 x- C r- Y: V8 s6 C6 `( g. _ paradigm held up well to attack. If so, deconstruction' Y+ f$ Q" H# {9 j: o. ~ will be a reinforcing process, and only incremental * P% S* J% o) c7 `changes to the Army’s theory will be necessary.! I( {1 k: ?( v' ` We can make quality improvements to understanding4 h V# x2 V% [/ o the problems at hand within the limits of an, f. S7 h- a( N4 N3 n4 ^ incrementally improved theory of effective leadership.6 R5 d' C. |9 }7 n5 F The second outcome is realizing that the Army’s$ j+ q% y( ?) _ assumptions about leadership are myths (or are at' q$ {9 Z! s, J# { least socially interpretable and based on conflicting1 ?, K3 q+ _' o9 v7 o' F values), and that transcendence to a higher plane8 y; |, n8 T" x% T2 e8 g w, s of thinking is required to make new sense of the Z/ Y/ ?5 Y* x$ m( K1 i; c+ ] world.2 X% k! O$ a8 z+ T/ P1 |: v Part of the greater societal paradigm is that we- |' h& |( ?8 [: A routinely process information to remove paradox;- s2 u6 P0 t% P6 `4 o3 t that is, we eliminate “contradictory yet interrelated5 \0 ~+ Y$ f( \/ G& V2 W elements . . . that seem logical in isolation but absurd; W# v) g! N D and irrational when appearing simultaneously.”5' K+ ^! O& D# ^! K1 F But, when we conceptualize what the paradox is,3 F" w2 }* l& U+ L' [* Q the act of conceptualization can serve as a transcendental1 Q2 Z3 V4 X; k3 G5 | mechanism—through a healthy dose of organizational 5 s- w$ l* L; rdissonance. Transformational change4 S5 B* w& v+ ^* C0 _ can result from dissonance and incommensurability.; x5 z* H( t, m" m1 ?6 @ We can reach new ways of framing the problems " P, a5 |+ T9 {* a9 a5 v) [0 Tof paradox through synthesis and dialectical reasoning( L& C3 x# D, \' }7 k, f1 U+ j or by accepting paradox as a normal state of( ^$ [ c0 Q) V8 k; c organization. / r: I! y0 t7 ^( |Mirror Images and Circular Logic 2 Z; p9 n. }1 {' W" {The Army’s leadership construct, rooted in the assumption * h5 |" O8 ^" V5 d# G D1 G: v1 Bof hierarchy, is an example of the stratified# m0 P$ M, O. Y systems theory (SST) proposed by psychologist+ f" `# T9 ~: a* l# a6 s Elliott Jaques.6 The essence of the SST is that* o; ]/ u6 w' C hierarchy is the best way to organize for accountability1 b: V* P5 W# L1 S" B3 D, T! _+ k and control. Discovering what makes leaders9 N% H+ |0 P- O" y) M% d at the top of the hierarchy successful allows& C4 R9 j. I4 g+ X" C- K$ q) J `4 _ one to train and educate successors in those same 5 T8 F9 Y, e6 O6 w: g5 {1 Equalities.7 The theory espouses that strategic leaders " t/ c0 \- |( t9 f Q: yat the hierarchy’s higher echelons have frames ( V/ E. I' M4 @: s" {% vof reference that are more—" ~! j& V* V0 Q$ K9 v$ [ l Interconnected, sophisticated, and actionoriented. ; c) E) t# F8 V0 j% {l Likely to anticipate second- and third-order 7 {8 y5 c1 Q M r9 xeffects because their frames of reference contain a" R2 S l# A! l0 }) e# a1 c5 ~# j complex adaptive systems (networks).% L5 l: j8 C8 N! }! b) H' x l Oriented on the organization’s external environment. / v8 I% h: O+ d+ q! L8 : B/ A, D. `- t. K0 A1 U ~$ CThe academe has commented unfavorably on hierarchical " U, ^# C& s- S* i( _1 _6 ?& ytheories of leadership because empirical : a% }' L& `) \/ [evidence has led scholars and practitioners away3 ^, B; {3 G$ ~$ u \" @- S2 W from assumptions about performance based on age' }# l& L& y7 I" Y Q$ N& K and experience and the need for hierarchical accountability. - w& [7 Z2 A- M! H* D! V9 Indeed, the information available to - T: I- K! X# @people who occupy high positions gives them significant& q( N) \3 N6 z8 B" R advantages over those who do not have access 8 t8 q0 \( u5 I8 i" k eto that information, which produces information" n( k* Z8 L; }7 x' D: ^ asymmetry. Thus, studies confirm that strategic ( r: d2 O3 j, B" gleaders make better decisions, but such studies rely " W) ]: _+ D0 ^ h9 m5 m; M+ Y$ ]on circular logic; for example, the reason strategic/ f9 ~. g! E( k leaders make better decisions is because they are) {2 `5 F; d, e! O" i better informed, and they are better informed because. s6 }+ `. q* d3 h: ^ they are strategic leaders.# g+ p) B- ~1 Z7 v: |7 e7 k Because the Army is hierarchical, it is suitable to 8 |( V( l3 m8 @: ]: u9 `theorize about leadership along these lines of thought. " q2 t, u$ W5 [. d& yThis is the reality that SST deals with as a normative # w/ |5 }; M$ v$ j4 A5 U7 eand descriptive theory of “what is,” but postindustrial $ T6 m2 Q# u! Corganizations do not have much in common : o2 j, T/ C( O5 Uwith bureaucracies, with their layers of management: O0 @# c' U. J. h# i" y! {" d and stovepiped functional arrangements. 2 R, c3 E& v+ VIn the 21st century, it is no longer acceptable to * ]8 @0 |6 h6 `assume that a leader’s influence on effectiveness : ~+ Z% e0 l' e- ris attributable to his position or rank. An understanding / \" i0 R: a: f, Cof leadership requires a much broader, more complex ! t! h: L8 f$ P& Uview of organizational effectiveness. Perhaps& {( ~$ h4 T( u8 g- s H5 ?. C the Army’s hierarchical view of leadership blinds us " P: u( N. l4 P6 a( i! Bto other interpretations. Gary Yukl, a leadership theorist, ) H; Z7 B& s" y* `makes the point that “viewing leadership in terms! h- |1 B+ |5 P6 e of reciprocal, recursive influence processes among - m& k: Z$ y1 y1 Hmultiple parties in a systems context is very different1 J, i5 t+ x8 l- O/ r from studying the unidirectional effects of a 5 P9 ]' Y' @2 R- w/ Qsingle leader on subordinates, and new research 9 a. M5 l& r N m' D) `! [, I) Amethods may be needed to describe and analyze the- i8 e0 z8 P( _' z5 I# w' S/ M. M- { complex nature of leadership processes in a social 6 ?0 y1 Y$ `) V1 N( c3 ^! {( Qsystem.”101 K) X" G1 S% \; G& ] Studies confirm that strategic leaders9 R3 Z5 }& w8 S3 H make better decisions, but such studies rely on & |2 D. @& l- j/ P0 zcircular logic; for example, the reason strategic % p; {5 A& z: R6 \5 Aleaders make better decisions is because they are 6 D/ W% g8 T0 S- {better informed, and they are better informed ( e$ q! {7 M6 K( Vbecause they are strategic leaders. & C1 m3 l# u) r0 F4 c8 m$ L% ZDECONSTRUCTING 8 _, m( ^: K& Z; Y5 g6 P' NARMY LEADERSHIP % K0 x8 G+ J2 H5 g+ F4 January -February 2004 l MILITARY REVIEW) n2 H q2 {8 F% h: X4 h; t3 e Having invested heavily in its hierarchical interpretation3 a9 [- z. H4 ^8 k6 }# E& A- x of leadership, in the late 1980s the Army3 Q: [0 \ i# q. a% Y9 {" Y1 J sponsored studies of the characteristics and traits of) `1 M e! ]; c2 B8 ~ three- and four-star generals. The studies defined( Z2 j) e1 x% n( o( E4 P effectiveness in terms of the characteristics of “successful”, y' g* [6 @5 N$ m6 U0 b' J/ d leaders who had been promoted. In the 4 i% _: L& F+ ^: v5 msame tradition of research, the USAWC surveyed6 h. D7 n& }6 l4 u general officers periodically to determine if officers1 W8 }3 k1 ]$ @. g7 Z1 O. j who were its graduates were effective as a result" z U# X7 r# G# s! N# A of the college’s efforts to mold them into strategic) y- ^) _! b5 Q. ]$ [/ L leaders.11 Because of this closed-loop thinking, the # N5 J6 P! h* e7 M' ~ HArmy generated a theory of leadership with an obvious 2 f8 r6 x, D. e7 Ymirror-image problem. A leader is said to be9 m- W3 T7 w( {- }9 j effective to the extent that he displays the characteristics ) r0 \6 p: w2 J9 Z6 Z4 s6 |3 j; Dof those who are in positions of power (and,$ o% T5 e3 E9 @! U- `8 e; \+ D therefore, presumed to be effective); this is clearly4 f- m; `% _6 i" m5 U6 ^3 x a case of circular logic.2 K# H, A& F* J$ d0 e Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100,
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