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Deconstructing Army Leadership
* r, I/ Z. m, k7 L6 G5 M7 d( W& t5 W( I) B
Colonel Christopher R. Paparone, U.S. Army
& v) G" z6 ^6 y( F6 l* lInstructor, U.S. Army War College, h0 y2 x) d( B" Y, h& w4 Q
$ j9 |; K$ f1 dentists tend to forget that they are and that they are! t6 z, X' E7 h$ Q$ k: B6 I
value-laden and not objective.)2% j' n. L# R s3 c1 o; [1 A( d5 u
The key to this critical discourse is to identify underlying- v1 l* z- T8 p
assumptions that might be taken as fact and
- f6 k5 P Z) @% O5 X5 G7 @then argue for alternative assumptions.3 The1 f* w0 c! q4 E4 a0 M: V
deconstructive process “look[s] for those spaces
! `+ i/ |4 U7 w: R+ ]5 J8 q* |7 Swhere the text is more likely to be submerging ‘its7 i* _: i/ ~' w- ?+ B5 _
other.’ It is there that the text is attempting to construct
' F( c! A8 _2 L+ c/ ]! \% wits own ‘truth’—where it can be shown to
+ m1 d7 H- S; L7 homit, ignore, or devalue its opposite—and where it
- f! r8 y* o6 W$ q2 W* his likely to contradict its own claims.”4. S1 X& U& o) U6 ? f6 w
Two types of outcomes are possible after5 r C0 s, e# |0 G/ J
deconstruction. One is that the Army’s current leadership
: _' L) F5 x$ C) l6 F1 g Lparadigm will be strengthened because the; H/ n9 ^: ?% {9 n3 b" J7 ]) U
paradigm held up well to attack. If so, deconstruction
* p& _9 C2 m9 l& [will be a reinforcing process, and only incremental
7 R% `% D' g! O5 o7 ^3 n# L& `changes to the Army’s theory will be necessary.: ~0 D8 c2 ]8 v0 Y: j2 P2 t8 h
We can make quality improvements to understanding8 ~% O- r6 \2 Q5 K6 _
the problems at hand within the limits of an
8 x: j8 D3 n7 {0 ^incrementally improved theory of effective leadership.5 p( Z8 f5 Y! B& s& A5 D
The second outcome is realizing that the Army’s
; P8 l- S# ~, W6 `0 r" t/ Z0 sassumptions about leadership are myths (or are at; D8 B. M6 m3 R: y1 F3 G/ k- u8 x
least socially interpretable and based on conflicting
) K7 A/ \' M3 E" t3 nvalues), and that transcendence to a higher plane
) M! n; g( D# v) {/ Yof thinking is required to make new sense of the" L9 ?6 _* U" \* M
world.5 o; P' i: d i' L! N" ?: |4 x/ x
Part of the greater societal paradigm is that we; f3 X- _, U" k; `! u& a/ \
routinely process information to remove paradox;3 V% ?& K+ x; i/ L* T
that is, we eliminate “contradictory yet interrelated
& [7 }5 e& T, }$ h$ |elements . . . that seem logical in isolation but absurd
1 C4 y- n: _. Xand irrational when appearing simultaneously.”5& g" b8 t4 `- m: R# ^' m3 X8 R
But, when we conceptualize what the paradox is,5 y0 m- V1 _7 A0 S( B4 [/ O7 G$ C
the act of conceptualization can serve as a transcendental
+ F& V; `3 u8 P. N! Hmechanism—through a healthy dose of organizational
; v5 R5 p4 X" d H Tdissonance. Transformational change( s$ t. U' K$ N* w( v
can result from dissonance and incommensurability.+ k3 k4 Z. ] f# w G' {3 }
We can reach new ways of framing the problems. W F n2 F$ O1 v6 D1 \. [1 Y
of paradox through synthesis and dialectical reasoning/ ]& x- Y8 B4 _' \& g+ Y
or by accepting paradox as a normal state of7 N8 s" b5 g& C( F V
organization.$ c% o. \6 L" R0 E6 k! D# p# _
Mirror Images and Circular Logic
0 q$ ?* q# ~ o1 h" VThe Army’s leadership construct, rooted in the assumption. H+ V) r: e2 B( {2 H
of hierarchy, is an example of the stratified/ A R0 u3 Y; {5 F$ v) L# K$ h1 O
systems theory (SST) proposed by psychologist7 P+ K4 L* t9 l0 d
Elliott Jaques.6 The essence of the SST is that
" v5 z( G1 ?! Q! Z3 L+ M p) jhierarchy is the best way to organize for accountability* H+ z/ h+ z f" O6 b1 {
and control. Discovering what makes leaders$ v" X' r' h9 ?0 [. C6 q
at the top of the hierarchy successful allows
e% g5 Q6 ?, i. Hone to train and educate successors in those same
- x1 w4 P2 `) q2 P% Q$ ~8 K# Nqualities.7 The theory espouses that strategic leaders
9 U) C% u& T$ Y- o2 |' {! n. sat the hierarchy’s higher echelons have frames7 _0 w( u; K1 ]8 c
of reference that are more—
: b; a: Q6 i# W4 A& _- \2 R1 Hl Interconnected, sophisticated, and actionoriented.
* y7 N4 V8 W! ^$ ]) hl Likely to anticipate second- and third-order
4 f: s$ Y+ l' R, r9 j6 E |7 Jeffects because their frames of reference contain
& P" A# f e! @- K; w; z- Mcomplex adaptive systems (networks).
0 v) `, C. m" `/ ol Oriented on the organization’s external environment.
9 L' h5 O% E8 J9 M l+ G8
, ^% |3 m0 {( n- z" VThe academe has commented unfavorably on hierarchical
$ w5 L3 b; q9 W# w( f0 A! ntheories of leadership because empirical; }# A+ b4 e% x) J' `; H1 R
evidence has led scholars and practitioners away& w' [4 ^( E! q( p0 t z6 s
from assumptions about performance based on age
' J' s2 }, H. G: ~8 @and experience and the need for hierarchical accountability.6 A* T" ]; F% E" I
9 Indeed, the information available to( ] T3 ?/ K) D' e" H
people who occupy high positions gives them significant
" r6 E! M6 n# L3 jadvantages over those who do not have access6 J8 ?" d( c. f! u# F# W9 Y+ K
to that information, which produces information g; } h+ a- a
asymmetry. Thus, studies confirm that strategic
+ z9 x! y0 b' s: J' ?9 P) bleaders make better decisions, but such studies rely, c9 g9 v4 X$ @4 [! \
on circular logic; for example, the reason strategic
) Q. o7 L; ?" P8 b5 Hleaders make better decisions is because they are! G; W. L! v8 }) ^. `( i
better informed, and they are better informed because
h* r0 \4 L% h, p5 n7 @% Wthey are strategic leaders.: _0 H S$ o9 Z9 X4 }
Because the Army is hierarchical, it is suitable to
- g- J& c7 s. ]theorize about leadership along these lines of thought.9 g% j) }6 `% L2 w4 h O: _
This is the reality that SST deals with as a normative7 u/ g/ A9 u2 }( u* m# X1 V- ?$ o
and descriptive theory of “what is,” but postindustrial
' J9 g2 R; R4 y2 Y( S) D4 forganizations do not have much in common
; t! [$ J, |, u" I2 U. Rwith bureaucracies, with their layers of management( [7 Q0 ^% d" l0 u) }) i$ H+ P- O. W7 {
and stovepiped functional arrangements.5 u* |+ Z; S, h3 w+ Y
In the 21st century, it is no longer acceptable to5 b7 M: W* N8 l0 c0 [3 n
assume that a leader’s influence on effectiveness5 k0 P# k- f9 P1 d9 o2 D- p
is attributable to his position or rank. An understanding q1 g& j) S" u$ J; ^& B' P1 O% @ K
of leadership requires a much broader, more complex
. d& h5 o! l3 O Yview of organizational effectiveness. Perhaps
9 e8 K: P4 C/ N X! u0 S; othe Army’s hierarchical view of leadership blinds us
' s' S, [: |6 v7 F; mto other interpretations. Gary Yukl, a leadership theorist, E6 v8 ^4 e! P7 o4 u. w" q
makes the point that “viewing leadership in terms
; ] U2 y9 R6 ]' [6 H, r/ s; V, Sof reciprocal, recursive influence processes among4 j7 Q; y; x8 k% h! U1 x& u
multiple parties in a systems context is very different
3 _1 x4 O: R& H- g/ W5 R; Mfrom studying the unidirectional effects of a0 o$ H: o' a! [5 b' {5 M
single leader on subordinates, and new research9 Y7 G( }# @' N5 ]8 w4 W3 m n
methods may be needed to describe and analyze the$ z: t% [: e; ~' I6 k- ]
complex nature of leadership processes in a social9 }1 q8 {( c8 q A/ o
system.”10
' |: X3 Z% i0 x7 p) mStudies confirm that strategic leaders
/ Y4 D1 ~- ]+ p4 z8 emake better decisions, but such studies rely on
9 d7 i$ c4 i% Kcircular logic; for example, the reason strategic
1 ~4 A- y2 j: ~% ]; d0 Tleaders make better decisions is because they are& ~8 L9 F/ Z! d
better informed, and they are better informed9 K9 T3 N7 K" i
because they are strategic leaders./ x n( d6 L, {
DECONSTRUCTING
' _% j; [( ^9 z% ^2 g4 G( e) lARMY LEADERSHIP
9 s4 E; }* I2 v- x4 January -February 2004 l MILITARY REVIEW% R+ n# _3 z3 k+ a( f
Having invested heavily in its hierarchical interpretation
! K7 e/ V4 H4 W! s' _of leadership, in the late 1980s the Army M$ U( C) ?- e6 y
sponsored studies of the characteristics and traits of
" b% k: x( A- M {' D, @6 }three- and four-star generals. The studies defined
& T$ \7 V4 q$ C9 W" b7 xeffectiveness in terms of the characteristics of “successful”
# d. [% f1 V8 r2 U9 }9 J+ ^8 yleaders who had been promoted. In the4 o8 ]$ q- e7 ]7 Q" N
same tradition of research, the USAWC surveyed
" b" t9 j5 ^' `. L3 ]7 h* ngeneral officers periodically to determine if officers
^: J, R/ {4 S- Jwho were its graduates were effective as a result1 j, ~2 W d. c2 z5 n" j3 l
of the college’s efforts to mold them into strategic
* i6 D' N* k. d& tleaders.11 Because of this closed-loop thinking, the
- P* }+ K* y# M4 u$ EArmy generated a theory of leadership with an obvious
/ y, a. c$ Y0 F3 f: bmirror-image problem. A leader is said to be$ d3 L6 d+ q' U2 w( [# G
effective to the extent that he displays the characteristics) P1 O" W+ J+ K. r4 r. `8 N
of those who are in positions of power (and,
z* r3 I" M4 y6 R9 k5 k% Dtherefore, presumed to be effective); this is clearly* D$ |. U+ c* S1 a
a case of circular logic.
8 z5 B% \' z% [( W. V' u. ZArmy Field Manual (FM) 22-100, |
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