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|
Deconstructing Army Leadership
6 J( |' F$ N; w0 E! Y) C7 {" B% B! J, B1 |
Colonel Christopher R. Paparone, U.S. Army
: B2 B k; g; J bInstructor, U.S. Army War College
1 H1 j$ `# p ?
2 R7 S$ ?) f1 Q8 w- r# `4 Dentists tend to forget that they are and that they are
8 ?8 E: P- V" Y8 Q! d1 Y( L$ y8 U* Qvalue-laden and not objective.)2
9 Z+ ?. e$ A1 |! F, Z2 IThe key to this critical discourse is to identify underlying
! `; E. V4 K( T* dassumptions that might be taken as fact and7 t* O/ g0 }" h0 q
then argue for alternative assumptions.3 The
# m3 `! B9 B5 Y E' \$ @deconstructive process “look[s] for those spaces
4 a1 R! v1 |0 T) w' P, t, ^where the text is more likely to be submerging ‘its
5 q g6 R' E+ v3 J" |+ ^' Dother.’ It is there that the text is attempting to construct! U$ Z; h4 Y1 @/ b7 f
its own ‘truth’—where it can be shown to
( d5 e$ B+ L( Z: h0 V, d6 Homit, ignore, or devalue its opposite—and where it9 Z, r- D! P! c) b0 A) s/ Q5 P
is likely to contradict its own claims.”4
* a; [$ _ o2 {Two types of outcomes are possible after
6 q5 G+ ?8 |% d; v/ Gdeconstruction. One is that the Army’s current leadership
X. j/ Z6 @* [ m5 N' |paradigm will be strengthened because the/ f) @! w! M( a1 e$ G3 i
paradigm held up well to attack. If so, deconstruction
# S% H1 s% T1 Y9 owill be a reinforcing process, and only incremental2 c6 e6 p6 P# Y& c; t
changes to the Army’s theory will be necessary.
3 d) r# d2 m( y0 R0 HWe can make quality improvements to understanding
/ C j9 |, t6 h! {" U% t3 mthe problems at hand within the limits of an6 e# X$ M/ @+ M
incrementally improved theory of effective leadership.5 w. R/ z3 [) ?: b! K& [% }
The second outcome is realizing that the Army’s% L7 h, p# s0 M+ l/ @. k. j
assumptions about leadership are myths (or are at' p, {$ v3 y, z/ W3 I, x
least socially interpretable and based on conflicting
1 }7 P' w5 b9 z' S" R1 A: Fvalues), and that transcendence to a higher plane
2 G X+ ?9 r9 \$ A% vof thinking is required to make new sense of the: v% D( c( `( q" D3 S& s' D! \
world.
8 Y+ P$ Y# {2 |8 ^* a9 u/ w0 d- ~* wPart of the greater societal paradigm is that we4 r: x( G6 f( J6 k
routinely process information to remove paradox;
^) z4 [1 S) ?1 T- A0 ]" wthat is, we eliminate “contradictory yet interrelated
$ n' h$ I0 I3 D- Zelements . . . that seem logical in isolation but absurd
( e7 o: C2 V. J2 Zand irrational when appearing simultaneously.”53 p7 K$ H, T$ `& b4 C+ F1 ^
But, when we conceptualize what the paradox is,# U. z! I6 q6 T2 N, j9 q& m
the act of conceptualization can serve as a transcendental
9 ~ G3 c1 a. D! ~ f( v8 Q8 e8 d) Gmechanism—through a healthy dose of organizational+ u6 F9 d) d& s$ @4 ]
dissonance. Transformational change
' T. V1 y- R! E& W' dcan result from dissonance and incommensurability.
! S' b" T% A2 Q# r9 `+ \& k& yWe can reach new ways of framing the problems0 Y4 z- W; t9 q9 I
of paradox through synthesis and dialectical reasoning& M: f$ a' a+ w. z
or by accepting paradox as a normal state of$ V% V# I g& L: H3 h
organization.
& q( Z6 s1 t- O8 OMirror Images and Circular Logic
& K X/ t P8 h2 F1 w8 dThe Army’s leadership construct, rooted in the assumption% \0 N, D. {& i$ O$ u% u
of hierarchy, is an example of the stratified
. O1 z9 }' S; Z. ^1 psystems theory (SST) proposed by psychologist* m% r) z' K- M) B' i2 Z3 G& H
Elliott Jaques.6 The essence of the SST is that
: S$ a. F3 T8 |7 b$ lhierarchy is the best way to organize for accountability* @7 o* \& u+ f/ C* N+ ]
and control. Discovering what makes leaders6 S( E$ z: x& k2 a4 a$ ]
at the top of the hierarchy successful allows+ o4 b& }0 q" T" _+ o
one to train and educate successors in those same1 i% `8 ` S, e, E
qualities.7 The theory espouses that strategic leaders9 ^( z |: j& I, G2 w8 t
at the hierarchy’s higher echelons have frames
; }# K! S% j% ?5 o4 u* G$ bof reference that are more—$ y1 f: S7 O. [) U# r
l Interconnected, sophisticated, and actionoriented./ M* ]* K8 z/ i4 Q" @) L
l Likely to anticipate second- and third-order
% x. K3 m9 `" zeffects because their frames of reference contain
6 I) B, _5 s6 \) D- K3 }9 {! rcomplex adaptive systems (networks).
! T, P/ ?5 [: `l Oriented on the organization’s external environment." R" e3 q4 ]* D- `7 s7 s, K
8
% _$ c! s I" kThe academe has commented unfavorably on hierarchical, ?4 j4 W; h$ \7 y% S- x; p9 j' t
theories of leadership because empirical
) t- `- L; U! z. P% Hevidence has led scholars and practitioners away1 N1 l% {8 h( n) l* L
from assumptions about performance based on age
3 S, c' x9 s! X4 ]and experience and the need for hierarchical accountability.7 |! h. v* M7 {: z1 Z5 ]5 b
9 Indeed, the information available to( p$ B2 y" A2 U @
people who occupy high positions gives them significant+ j( W% H6 P1 B+ \. c. D
advantages over those who do not have access
# L+ t$ Q. e3 z; O$ A* r; Nto that information, which produces information/ \) O- c. Z7 K( f
asymmetry. Thus, studies confirm that strategic
3 C# K% E7 q! U3 D) C6 vleaders make better decisions, but such studies rely
) f; G6 h2 ^$ B! V! {: V* H0 y# Won circular logic; for example, the reason strategic
4 m9 i! W! I# T+ y' L1 `$ _leaders make better decisions is because they are
- h& c! S9 e0 N$ p2 n& U3 Y! ubetter informed, and they are better informed because
. u. L5 R5 _) g( X4 Ethey are strategic leaders., V* M! |0 P& L D, X* m+ h
Because the Army is hierarchical, it is suitable to
! F+ G! |; u% P+ t2 _9 y8 btheorize about leadership along these lines of thought.. L7 i# \; l$ K: W& R
This is the reality that SST deals with as a normative& t: ~5 t8 y: P. I
and descriptive theory of “what is,” but postindustrial
$ z+ P' s1 c; T7 f9 ~8 X) D- Worganizations do not have much in common
, I: C3 n9 }2 u @0 z9 H; fwith bureaucracies, with their layers of management
; G+ b5 C- c0 s( K) r4 U" [, s: Band stovepiped functional arrangements.2 E* J9 n2 t3 j
In the 21st century, it is no longer acceptable to
7 T6 \+ }( M: ]/ e+ A2 kassume that a leader’s influence on effectiveness
0 L0 w, ^2 \2 `8 q5 j& Gis attributable to his position or rank. An understanding
& j6 u b* W/ W- Y7 `/ v- K" Yof leadership requires a much broader, more complex- Q1 ^/ c" u, s
view of organizational effectiveness. Perhaps
9 k2 c1 } Q* f; _/ g! F. V+ Dthe Army’s hierarchical view of leadership blinds us
, @ R" X! `; @4 h2 q2 jto other interpretations. Gary Yukl, a leadership theorist,
5 R+ s# u2 m5 \- F; m& G$ n- Omakes the point that “viewing leadership in terms
) ]8 C7 c, K" b: gof reciprocal, recursive influence processes among
' s: v/ @7 l. M5 hmultiple parties in a systems context is very different+ o: {, ^# _) e6 g6 R5 ~
from studying the unidirectional effects of a H* R+ z w' z/ q
single leader on subordinates, and new research
" H1 m( N9 R" t5 c- @* J/ Gmethods may be needed to describe and analyze the' j4 i6 M% i7 t$ S9 _$ ~* ^3 e- [
complex nature of leadership processes in a social
3 t+ M; K2 {" a% E5 ^system.”10: U) W) C2 X' V4 H" `$ l
Studies confirm that strategic leaders
+ x" ~; p2 _4 _1 P8 B$ a& Tmake better decisions, but such studies rely on9 Z, g$ G3 n3 L2 G
circular logic; for example, the reason strategic$ F+ E0 o6 g4 g, M" N
leaders make better decisions is because they are' T- g* h% ~- e* G3 X& S) P$ \/ K
better informed, and they are better informed
, [8 i5 h8 d; {4 f4 Fbecause they are strategic leaders.
: e: V; C- y/ `+ C9 r& W) o6 f/ QDECONSTRUCTING
' D s# A5 t/ O' {& pARMY LEADERSHIP
/ i+ w4 l! g" C" r4 January -February 2004 l MILITARY REVIEW
( J% M7 A( m/ X/ t, G& \! CHaving invested heavily in its hierarchical interpretation
* r6 c8 t3 Q) K, k! n' Uof leadership, in the late 1980s the Army
3 _! M8 [% k7 L2 q& b* ?sponsored studies of the characteristics and traits of! R$ B* x, c' H
three- and four-star generals. The studies defined- s _# M$ D0 U! Y
effectiveness in terms of the characteristics of “successful”
! N& b; P% E3 ]* K- qleaders who had been promoted. In the+ {* n! t+ z0 o. w. b% h
same tradition of research, the USAWC surveyed
# ?* I* _* O9 ^ F- A1 t& Igeneral officers periodically to determine if officers9 J; h8 i- Q4 O8 Z+ L" ]9 U
who were its graduates were effective as a result
8 l( c: Q5 E6 g9 Y0 e+ O# Dof the college’s efforts to mold them into strategic
3 C/ @* Z. [% ]# }+ cleaders.11 Because of this closed-loop thinking, the
( n5 a' ?( _8 tArmy generated a theory of leadership with an obvious
- m1 x0 A( a' c! D- Y2 S1 hmirror-image problem. A leader is said to be2 `- a* U# [( O* K
effective to the extent that he displays the characteristics
! {# p/ m6 b p3 e, Iof those who are in positions of power (and,- b; p9 M5 a0 d
therefore, presumed to be effective); this is clearly
U. V3 H$ V, @a case of circular logic.
# |! Q, W9 r3 N! i# x1 VArmy Field Manual (FM) 22-100, |
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