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Deconstructing Army Leadership/ _6 \; |: U$ o& m
+ E+ l1 ~3 M: Z" Y8 m' TColonel Christopher R. Paparone, U.S. Army. N% g) r0 A& {7 y! f6 y3 w
Instructor, U.S. Army War College8 M' O( l- a- S6 p0 g( a9 f' h
& j2 K+ E1 X- X A% w& P7 u
entists tend to forget that they are and that they are$ Q5 b, f8 v: B& s4 Y/ E
value-laden and not objective.)2
) I; V9 c# s. \" iThe key to this critical discourse is to identify underlying
% F; H4 v5 ~+ `/ R* oassumptions that might be taken as fact and# Q& Y8 i# b. M0 }; w% o
then argue for alternative assumptions.3 The. x& U5 e7 f9 s) c% n
deconstructive process “look[s] for those spaces
: B6 {, P6 a4 l0 Awhere the text is more likely to be submerging ‘its
2 d, r; O* p Z$ x) ?* Hother.’ It is there that the text is attempting to construct
+ D- \! }; U$ {( G& \; F2 h% D7 Mits own ‘truth’—where it can be shown to: E" [: B9 `- @# b( c+ Y
omit, ignore, or devalue its opposite—and where it% ^! H. U8 e& n. l. W7 a! D
is likely to contradict its own claims.”4
/ G9 P* P7 G- \* u- k% o! }Two types of outcomes are possible after
R |- }$ _1 k/ U* K& }deconstruction. One is that the Army’s current leadership( H* l1 K2 A! ]* f
paradigm will be strengthened because the
& J l7 x2 |2 _5 h5 _paradigm held up well to attack. If so, deconstruction( k0 \3 D! F7 c% X) I
will be a reinforcing process, and only incremental U5 V+ y9 Q6 z) K' C2 t0 h7 K
changes to the Army’s theory will be necessary.
7 r5 K" j2 ~# E3 DWe can make quality improvements to understanding# I" _& O7 o# f1 X: ]" `
the problems at hand within the limits of an
0 E$ h. C+ ?+ Vincrementally improved theory of effective leadership.& H A2 b4 a. G
The second outcome is realizing that the Army’s/ G" U9 f% H8 M9 ~4 x/ @- }
assumptions about leadership are myths (or are at
1 T$ |' G) I/ K4 d& F' ?least socially interpretable and based on conflicting
7 z4 e% w9 v% L) {* I, rvalues), and that transcendence to a higher plane' E$ R* V) Q( f1 Y% f* _
of thinking is required to make new sense of the
; m9 |# W. D0 c0 R8 V- t* cworld.% ?5 L: r% c8 a
Part of the greater societal paradigm is that we5 ?/ R2 w( ^! V3 `9 W" u$ Y8 f
routinely process information to remove paradox;
. [3 \% {0 h9 ^% [4 [! t7 Athat is, we eliminate “contradictory yet interrelated
) l2 j/ \/ R. y6 `9 `elements . . . that seem logical in isolation but absurd
+ P- `8 m/ I2 D: h n" rand irrational when appearing simultaneously.”5
3 p# n" k- m0 R+ m" QBut, when we conceptualize what the paradox is,% C5 J; X$ y1 M4 b8 |. F
the act of conceptualization can serve as a transcendental
. V. M1 B/ |3 j0 q) `: K- Mmechanism—through a healthy dose of organizational
$ A1 F5 B/ Z1 s& B X% _dissonance. Transformational change
! H4 }* ^( u$ R( r/ @) ~$ r4 Pcan result from dissonance and incommensurability.0 f3 l+ K2 ~9 B
We can reach new ways of framing the problems
1 Z4 a) L. Z! i% V Eof paradox through synthesis and dialectical reasoning. R0 H- F2 ^: H; f! I
or by accepting paradox as a normal state of5 k* P9 r& U) Q; d4 ]" g. k
organization.4 o4 U9 ]8 A+ R. x) Z" E
Mirror Images and Circular Logic
+ J' h6 ]% z) Y3 W: K2 yThe Army’s leadership construct, rooted in the assumption% \! P' E/ P* T- W7 m. d
of hierarchy, is an example of the stratified& F$ q, T/ R8 t2 \6 n. c
systems theory (SST) proposed by psychologist
1 B* q+ p5 e* sElliott Jaques.6 The essence of the SST is that1 g* B* H1 T( T! T
hierarchy is the best way to organize for accountability/ V6 J; |6 E! D; ]! H0 W9 T" [3 {
and control. Discovering what makes leaders
* r/ G) }" w. U6 A3 Q Q0 V6 Bat the top of the hierarchy successful allows
\7 T) c8 T) m" A; X1 u. vone to train and educate successors in those same
+ u- K) E1 ?. o/ t2 [3 qqualities.7 The theory espouses that strategic leaders- d/ h R R+ B" h1 ^2 y8 @
at the hierarchy’s higher echelons have frames6 O, ]% f" Z2 k% W2 K- N1 Q
of reference that are more—
) M0 ~. i4 A6 C( F4 t7 _8 n- Al Interconnected, sophisticated, and actionoriented.
5 t" H5 ~% m c: E& m6 u! rl Likely to anticipate second- and third-order5 h! ]: y/ K2 o# @# v; u
effects because their frames of reference contain4 `$ O' _$ ]4 D. N9 i- d
complex adaptive systems (networks).
6 z; Q% n& h9 q# B' _1 fl Oriented on the organization’s external environment.
" L9 m1 |) i( m' z' p8
8 f0 M7 ^& R( J8 p/ UThe academe has commented unfavorably on hierarchical
0 y) k8 Y+ s' Z6 @1 j5 t$ O2 Mtheories of leadership because empirical0 P) S/ E: X* Z. B6 n7 L, \
evidence has led scholars and practitioners away
2 Y/ s3 o# R& b8 ^) U& ifrom assumptions about performance based on age
2 U; I: A& ^* ?: Y5 Qand experience and the need for hierarchical accountability.. Y; Z+ D5 D! X
9 Indeed, the information available to
- [9 ?# ]( y. Y- Y( Z jpeople who occupy high positions gives them significant: e! O% f4 [5 a. I
advantages over those who do not have access# U8 R6 K, j9 N) _% g
to that information, which produces information3 s: ]7 U) L: Q/ }% b( ^- C4 Z
asymmetry. Thus, studies confirm that strategic
9 z5 ?/ q9 q: h# A8 c3 D pleaders make better decisions, but such studies rely
8 T' z4 L9 W H& y7 Qon circular logic; for example, the reason strategic
2 F) n2 n0 w* `7 R# _, A- Aleaders make better decisions is because they are
^) Y, G: d% @better informed, and they are better informed because( w& w7 x, v' J0 H+ M* W+ B$ Z
they are strategic leaders./ i1 y' ^0 A( Y/ y% S1 V% k& z
Because the Army is hierarchical, it is suitable to
, p4 U! j- d% X- S7 Utheorize about leadership along these lines of thought.4 s0 b% M! p' R% t& ~7 R
This is the reality that SST deals with as a normative
! ~& N/ M: [- A5 sand descriptive theory of “what is,” but postindustrial9 C2 h( f6 W* E5 W( Q ]* c
organizations do not have much in common
1 e7 p s2 r% H& {2 G* P- @with bureaucracies, with their layers of management
V/ C: U; t9 t* C' ^and stovepiped functional arrangements.% u0 c# y( B2 e9 p3 Q
In the 21st century, it is no longer acceptable to7 S7 K( I; r9 R, K) ^
assume that a leader’s influence on effectiveness
* z& W. c2 G5 J! e9 eis attributable to his position or rank. An understanding: h. J4 w; }$ ?( V3 M! i
of leadership requires a much broader, more complex% u. m, P0 g6 w' g& d, p1 r
view of organizational effectiveness. Perhaps
, @; s8 T4 _( R& y$ Ethe Army’s hierarchical view of leadership blinds us
' c$ I: m- y" Pto other interpretations. Gary Yukl, a leadership theorist,
3 c) w( U5 }$ f, T7 Emakes the point that “viewing leadership in terms% @5 h5 q4 g) l+ g
of reciprocal, recursive influence processes among
2 S2 D! I2 z* M, z5 R+ x* ~0 B% @multiple parties in a systems context is very different
& Z# M- E* F! U, x8 y% Kfrom studying the unidirectional effects of a
( J2 ]# Y1 i' K; y, |4 Usingle leader on subordinates, and new research
7 P# J' Z% P4 c& t+ c% pmethods may be needed to describe and analyze the- Z5 i- O8 V" a2 [" @7 d9 K
complex nature of leadership processes in a social; a# J, K/ @, F0 W0 f7 k% s
system.”10/ y/ r$ z. s4 ?" ~: O
Studies confirm that strategic leaders6 J5 x% O" m2 b1 M9 u! z. p
make better decisions, but such studies rely on
/ u( O) a6 C/ v: H) ?circular logic; for example, the reason strategic% P8 t4 I4 l0 k+ ~" S
leaders make better decisions is because they are
6 l$ t: c- i4 {: z& ybetter informed, and they are better informed
. K. s2 B0 _3 f" ^; P, Nbecause they are strategic leaders.& O$ v3 g( q, }. y
DECONSTRUCTING
* `# h9 c" `3 P( Q6 _ARMY LEADERSHIP- Y6 U0 s0 b9 L. b& P0 F8 M
4 January -February 2004 l MILITARY REVIEW/ k. `3 z7 M x
Having invested heavily in its hierarchical interpretation
7 Y5 p, t( O& }2 q" N' v% h! nof leadership, in the late 1980s the Army
1 v: H1 f# s& w# Tsponsored studies of the characteristics and traits of
8 |( v; e- A5 ]! q* U* G: Othree- and four-star generals. The studies defined( a5 w. y$ H3 G: y1 [: C: A) T) n ^; u
effectiveness in terms of the characteristics of “successful”
! q! q3 Z3 v' Y. s o& s5 }/ A+ j+ b aleaders who had been promoted. In the3 Z# K) _* h4 f# I$ e
same tradition of research, the USAWC surveyed
6 e' |$ {8 s' @general officers periodically to determine if officers) k3 C4 Y3 m: ?5 V+ W
who were its graduates were effective as a result
6 ~7 @2 g* H" b( P" xof the college’s efforts to mold them into strategic
8 T$ m" g/ w! |" y4 J" sleaders.11 Because of this closed-loop thinking, the
; I. x- j( p! p ~: s; q3 d! ]Army generated a theory of leadership with an obvious q! D! L. `3 e0 T3 O6 s
mirror-image problem. A leader is said to be# V2 u1 o# ?+ F, c) t4 ^
effective to the extent that he displays the characteristics* d1 d4 H) ^; O' I" C- B, B$ B& E$ k
of those who are in positions of power (and,
3 G% \9 f; r- Z0 l0 Qtherefore, presumed to be effective); this is clearly$ s! p& u! Q6 x0 F
a case of circular logic.5 ^6 I5 f9 M" |, M
Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, |
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