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[转载] 解构军队领导(军事评论杂志2004年度最佳)

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发表于 2005-9-5 16:50:00 |只看该作者 |倒序浏览
Deconstructing Army Leadership ! g m% e1 g, t+ `' y& B- h& t J Z2 n! K( L7 D* S/ g Colonel Christopher R. Paparone, U.S. Army 3 H4 ~0 D5 m" U/ e: a1 r1 m+ sInstructor, U.S. Army War College ( s6 x, C4 v7 j0 Q" _$ X/ B7 Z8 v6 T entists tend to forget that they are and that they are/ I( ~/ h4 D4 E4 |% }, Z5 F value-laden and not objective.)2 ; ?7 D! y9 R0 S7 m5 ^2 M: D: u/ [The key to this critical discourse is to identify underlying 2 B% L( I4 r& Xassumptions that might be taken as fact and N1 B: X2 m! A% k5 N- C$ Tthen argue for alternative assumptions.3 The$ r9 c- n1 U- ^+ C1 O& z* o deconstructive process “look[s] for those spaces + A4 ?2 ]( ]; ~% J" f: K; Zwhere the text is more likely to be submerging ‘its: c8 t* G4 V. {* X0 ?7 o# \* ] other.’ It is there that the text is attempting to construct/ r7 N6 h" H7 U" v$ h3 W its own ‘truth’—where it can be shown to6 A& v' `7 i# V& p/ U* c omit, ignore, or devalue its opposite—and where it) c5 |) m" v) t# g2 |+ y is likely to contradict its own claims.”4& U; w+ R3 h0 P+ t* ^2 z$ X4 M( p3 D Two types of outcomes are possible after ! r3 X4 p% t3 z& t1 `! R9 g5 q& udeconstruction. One is that the Army’s current leadership/ [+ Y9 a; C% G/ H0 O9 i9 j paradigm will be strengthened because the ; t8 E) M# t7 Zparadigm held up well to attack. If so, deconstruction k& I: s+ |3 k# O9 d& @ will be a reinforcing process, and only incremental" J# N e3 u: O( X. Z' b- ^ changes to the Army’s theory will be necessary. ! v# L& D+ X# n$ x. wWe can make quality improvements to understanding8 ]/ U$ [3 I) C/ K' ~* p* [. y* q0 s the problems at hand within the limits of an ! p7 }& [; s) z9 J9 Uincrementally improved theory of effective leadership. % ]$ n7 P5 b2 {; XThe second outcome is realizing that the Army’s; [( m, k+ T; L; r# \, q assumptions about leadership are myths (or are at* `7 {3 e* O- o4 z+ Y; Y( B& Y least socially interpretable and based on conflicting 3 f; m% j7 o! uvalues), and that transcendence to a higher plane - Q1 x+ m4 a S6 `0 vof thinking is required to make new sense of the" x# X6 g; h5 C2 O/ t' h9 } M world.6 U9 N) p- Q: K Part of the greater societal paradigm is that we4 B- f5 D! l% ^ routinely process information to remove paradox;" l1 r3 K j3 N( N! V4 s that is, we eliminate “contradictory yet interrelated ' w3 Z1 r2 k- \2 Uelements . . . that seem logical in isolation but absurd ' m/ W* N9 f8 i, ^& K8 ]and irrational when appearing simultaneously.”54 B* e, ], g( p! w But, when we conceptualize what the paradox is, , ^( R: j% L _the act of conceptualization can serve as a transcendental $ H3 ]1 z" F7 b3 r( bmechanism—through a healthy dose of organizational9 P& t6 C' V7 m dissonance. Transformational change$ Y; q( b$ V# H1 a* d. k9 L1 z8 F can result from dissonance and incommensurability.# W/ C& j O& U" i We can reach new ways of framing the problems 2 |7 u: v" o& w( A+ [$ bof paradox through synthesis and dialectical reasoning 8 i2 z, d. y+ i+ ]9 j2 G- s% Ror by accepting paradox as a normal state of: g* P% J3 v: }4 K" n organization. + m$ ^) X( S3 aMirror Images and Circular Logic6 y: }9 r, a0 X6 P4 o The Army’s leadership construct, rooted in the assumption4 u" J- b5 H$ k# x4 @ of hierarchy, is an example of the stratified( @& \3 p7 J: ?$ H- J4 x+ ^# O systems theory (SST) proposed by psychologist; }2 b7 J! K0 U0 V: r! R- I Elliott Jaques.6 The essence of the SST is that+ s" M, i; K* v/ a4 y8 h9 X3 l hierarchy is the best way to organize for accountability ' L2 s) V) E& R3 q! x3 ~7 s1 S+ e; ~% E' hand control. Discovering what makes leaders : I- P! t8 x$ lat the top of the hierarchy successful allows ! e( f! P6 V* A! Uone to train and educate successors in those same* @# q( M$ f/ J qualities.7 The theory espouses that strategic leaders1 w) d7 `7 _$ j0 R/ _; E at the hierarchy’s higher echelons have frames ! E) Q/ V# T$ X% p; Q6 D% Dof reference that are more— 5 w% H7 A% d# r( C/ E L/ sl Interconnected, sophisticated, and actionoriented.( m+ R5 p. J& D l Likely to anticipate second- and third-order * l8 F, N6 {7 U7 }effects because their frames of reference contain |& g9 u0 Q3 R" n5 Z; z1 ccomplex adaptive systems (networks). ! L: `: B3 [+ {: o; J6 Hl Oriented on the organization’s external environment. * [# x: Q4 o, s7 F8 : ^4 t, P' A2 Q" e; iThe academe has commented unfavorably on hierarchical" ~6 J% i5 N" s; F6 n theories of leadership because empirical Y. o: B" T. T5 t# jevidence has led scholars and practitioners away # {& {6 Z3 z# Vfrom assumptions about performance based on age % K* h0 j: ?5 gand experience and the need for hierarchical accountability. . t3 }1 C6 a2 U! ]' b9 Indeed, the information available to! }/ @7 s$ r. Z" V7 R* g people who occupy high positions gives them significant" e' Y. k% l8 X0 g3 e advantages over those who do not have access9 |5 O, ~: o% d, u) n5 @ to that information, which produces information " R6 F ~" y4 f* g0 |asymmetry. Thus, studies confirm that strategic* P p' Z1 a: L3 z" X- y, Y leaders make better decisions, but such studies rely 2 ^5 \; ? C! V- P1 ? H% D. Non circular logic; for example, the reason strategic 1 p. T$ u# A1 Q1 sleaders make better decisions is because they are: d1 W% |1 H% N( A7 n better informed, and they are better informed because9 }9 ]7 ?$ _. J: V3 n% w4 e$ ?. I they are strategic leaders.% X9 M& j, K3 R7 A* U H$ V! _3 g Because the Army is hierarchical, it is suitable to6 }& A: A& p0 s% m theorize about leadership along these lines of thought.4 l {% h( x0 W7 {" G This is the reality that SST deals with as a normative! \ v6 O& ?4 D9 X) S* Q and descriptive theory of “what is,” but postindustrial * G0 d! u1 L3 ? t! K8 g: z2 A5 _organizations do not have much in common0 G" @$ A; X4 Q9 G) d J with bureaucracies, with their layers of management) |4 T6 Z' H- r) x3 n and stovepiped functional arrangements. . e. p# q* X/ gIn the 21st century, it is no longer acceptable to & `6 o% E5 I9 I# {+ s$ W- uassume that a leader’s influence on effectiveness, U6 `- S, D: ]; `/ ] is attributable to his position or rank. An understanding 7 @" w' h; y2 ] }of leadership requires a much broader, more complex 8 _7 |# g" K, l8 P9 bview of organizational effectiveness. Perhaps " k6 X" V# }) {6 @the Army’s hierarchical view of leadership blinds us 0 U0 o1 o; I$ k& Y% N T$ Qto other interpretations. Gary Yukl, a leadership theorist, 2 P- P, S8 [; R7 Y' y% Y# f- Kmakes the point that “viewing leadership in terms $ I2 ?" W2 n, f# z& Q5 `of reciprocal, recursive influence processes among 7 t) V3 |; X0 ^2 qmultiple parties in a systems context is very different 0 D) T, q+ } r Zfrom studying the unidirectional effects of a ' W7 @) I5 z. [! e+ X6 Rsingle leader on subordinates, and new research6 u/ n9 w& z* k. P methods may be needed to describe and analyze the 9 [3 \8 p) f1 Zcomplex nature of leadership processes in a social . N7 J6 s' _6 ~3 J( b" p2 h% [. o* rsystem.”10 . ]. _0 S/ S. ^- L5 z8 N! ]Studies confirm that strategic leaders' `. i1 |- z: z' G make better decisions, but such studies rely on : r4 [: q; U3 U/ k7 s& W# I7 acircular logic; for example, the reason strategic) s5 q2 W! r% n leaders make better decisions is because they are% z2 m" M* f) K, o" i better informed, and they are better informed. U6 I$ R. `% S8 [% F8 K9 | because they are strategic leaders.& @ o: \+ r6 U8 n( g5 y4 X DECONSTRUCTING) E* d6 M: F9 q$ t8 X ARMY LEADERSHIP4 I$ X3 T1 e# k& D# i 4 January -February 2004 l MILITARY REVIEW 7 b. I D; N [Having invested heavily in its hierarchical interpretation 6 T7 I# Z2 k3 U$ o8 u' Tof leadership, in the late 1980s the Army 3 v0 ^# I; ^3 k. N3 h# gsponsored studies of the characteristics and traits of / T( Z& E! z. gthree- and four-star generals. The studies defined . r( ` _1 v! S7 Z8 m! Deffectiveness in terms of the characteristics of “successful” + x7 s' F9 b% i, k+ uleaders who had been promoted. In the 9 m/ g$ I' }: E6 K: Jsame tradition of research, the USAWC surveyed 2 z5 |) h8 N4 e: Qgeneral officers periodically to determine if officers ( [" h- }/ {: f$ R# b' Mwho were its graduates were effective as a result 2 ~/ n' W# G. Y4 E) l- A- s0 Jof the college’s efforts to mold them into strategic/ E* Q5 T, k8 }3 n. f8 v8 q' b leaders.11 Because of this closed-loop thinking, the+ C$ T, @$ |) |% b) V# x6 _* C Army generated a theory of leadership with an obvious 3 j) X2 k) |/ o E) L6 ]/ [mirror-image problem. A leader is said to be2 @, n% E7 Q2 y0 I' @ effective to the extent that he displays the characteristics * u2 J! S8 |& y/ G' A" o( u( xof those who are in positions of power (and, ]% k: h5 i+ T$ B" d4 `therefore, presumed to be effective); this is clearly7 c7 H4 n3 C. L$ Q: j a case of circular logic.3 }( N, x" |8 R" w+ H \ Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100,
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